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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The United Kingdom has pursued a range of actions in support of the disarmament objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.:

    • Announced reductions in its nuclear arsenal by the mid-2020s set out in its 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review
      • Reduce the number of warheads onboard each of our submarines from 48 to 40
      • Reduce the requirement for operationally available warheads to no more than 120
      • Reduce the number of operational missiles on the Vanguard class submarines to no more than 8
      • Reduce our overall nuclear weapons stockpile to no more than 180.
    • Promoted Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: provide expert advice in seismology and radiochemistry to help establish a viable verification regime, ready for entry into force; maintained the United Kingdom National Data Centre and hosted 13 facilities spread across the United Kingdom and our Overseas Territories, which support the International Monitoring System
    • Pushed for negotiations to start on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament and took an active role in the 2014–2015 Group of Governmental Experts and the 2017–2018 high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group.
    • Stated in a joint P5 statement in 2022 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
    • Pursued nuclear disarmament verification through UK-Norway Initiative on nuclear disarmament verification since 2007 and a second decade of an active partnership with the United States on monitoring and verification research
    • Signed a Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia (2014)
    • Been an active member of the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV); established a unique ‘Quad’ nuclear verification partnership in 2015 between two Non-Nuclear Weapon States and two Nuclear Weapon States; conducted the first-ever multilateral nuclear disarmament verification exercise known as LETTERPRESS to investigate real-life considerations related to the inclusion of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in nuclear disarmament verification
    • Actively participating in the “Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” initiative and welcoming the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament.
    • Funded projects with academia and think tanks, including the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the University of Birmingham exploring States’ conceptions of their responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons.
    • Hosted round tables and strategic dialogues to develop greater trust, confidence and transparency between NPT states in relation to nuclear weapons and to foster constructive global dialogue on progressing nuclear disarmament.
    • Supported a Middle East free of Weapons of Mass Destruction as co-convenor of the conference on the Zone.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Over the current Review Cycle the United Kingdom has

    1. Reiterated in a 2024 statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
    2. Supported the Pact of the Future, adopted by world leaders in October 2024, which contains the first multilateral recommitment to nuclear disarmament in over a decade.
    3. Initiated a programme of work with NNWS and civil society on irreversibility in nuclear disarmament
    4. Expanded its work on nuclear disarmament verification through the QUAD, IPNDV and UN GGEs.
    5. Failed to reach agreement necessary to ratify the Protocol to the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone.

    Sources

    • Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrence. Cm 6994 (London: 2006).
    • Ministry of Defence. The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2014 Update to Parliament (London, 2014).
    • Ministry of Defence. The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2017 Update to Parliament (London, 2017).
    • Ministry of Defence. The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2019 Update to Parliament (London, 2019).The United Kingdom’s future nuclear deterrent: the 2020 update to Parliament
    • Ministry of Defence.The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2022 Update to Parliament (London, 2022).
    • Cabinet Office. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm, 7948 (London, 2010).
    • Cabinet Office. National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom. Cm 9161 (London, 2015)
    • Cabinet Office. Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. CP 103 (London), 2021.
    • Ministry of Defence. Defence Nuclear Enterprise: 2025 Annual Update to Parliament (London, 2025).
    • Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 3 May 2012.
    • Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 7 May 2012.
    • Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster II: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 9 May 2012.
    • Ambassador Jo Adamson. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 24 April 2013.
    • Ambassador Jo Adamsom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 26 April 2013.
    • Ambassador Jo Adamson. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2013 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 30 April 2013.
    • Ambassador Matthew Roland. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2014 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2014.
    • Ambassador Matthew Roland. Cluster II: Non-proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2014 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 1 May 2014.
    • Ambassador Matthew Roland. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2014 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 5 May 2014.
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document (London: 2014).
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. General Debate. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 27 April 2015.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 1 May 2015.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee II. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 4 May 2015.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee III. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 5 May 2015.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 4 May 2017.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 May 2017.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2017 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 3 May 2017.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Middle East WMD Free Zone. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 30 April 2018.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 26 April 2018.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 30 April 2018.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 1 May 2018.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. NPT Preparatory Committee Verification Statement on behalf of ‘the Quad’ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the United States .United Kingdom Delegation at the 2019 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2019.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. General Debate. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 1 August 2022.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 5 August 2022.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee II. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 8 August 2022.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee III. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 8 August 2022.
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 3 August 2023.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 4 August 2023.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2023 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 8 August 2023.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 26 July 2024.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2024 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Geneva), 30 July 2024.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 1 May 2025.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 6 May 2025.
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2015.
    • Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races. 3 January 2022. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61d308ffe90e071971e25654/Joint_Statement_Of_the_Leaders_of_the_Five_Nuclear-Weapon_States_On_Preventing_Nuclear_War_and_Avoiding_Arms_Races.pdf
    • United Nations. Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki at the UN Security Council meeting on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. ‘Nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought: UK statement at the UN Security Council’ (New York). 18 March 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nuclear-war-cannot-be-won-and-must-not-be-fought-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council#:~:text=We%20reaffirm%20the%20P5%20leaders,maintain%20a%20minimum%20credible%20deterrent.
  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The UK has eliminated its arsenal of WE177 gravity bombs that were deployed on Royal Air Force and Royal Navy aircraft and helicopters. All the weapons were dismantled by August 1998 and fissile material recovered from dismantled WE177 warheads was retained for defence purposes. The UK also dismantled its final Chevaline (Polaris) warheads in April 2002 leaving Trident as the UK’s sole nuclear weapons system.

    The UK has also embarked on a wide-ranging modernisation of its nuclear weapons complex and submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons system since 2005. This has involved:

    • Construction of a new ‘Dreadnought’ class of ballistic missile submarines to deploy the Trident II (D5) SLBM following a parliamentary vote in 2007.
    • Participation in a US life extension programme to modernise the Trident SLBM fleet
    • Started work on a new A21/Mk7 ‘Astrea’ warhead to replace the current Holbrook warhead.
    • Investment in a suite of facilities at AWE Aldermaston and AWE Burghfield under the Nuclear Weapons Capability Sustainment Programme since 2005, including radiographic, hydrodynamics, and high-energy laser facilities, a new warhead assembly and disassembly plant, and a Future Materials Campus for the manufacture and storage of nuclear materials, improved science and analysis capabilities and processes to recover used materials.
    • Investment in the Technology Development Centre supporting the UK-France Teutates programme at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston (in operation since 2014) and the French Atomic Energy Commission’s Epure facility at Valduc, France, for future UK hydrodynamic and radiographic experiments.Significant investment in the Rolls Royce Raynesway site that produces submarine reactor cores for UK SSBNs and SSNs.
    • Significant investment in BAE Systems Barrow shipyard at Barrow-in-Furness that builds UK SSBNs and SSNs.
    • Significant investment in His Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde where the UK’s SSBN and SSN fleets are based including the Royal Naval Armaments Depot (RNAD) Coulport where nuclear warheads are stored and loaded onto submarines.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    The UK has not undertaken any further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed. Instead, it has increased the ceiling on its stockpile of nuclear warheads from 225 to 260 and continued the modernisation of the nuclear weapons complex and its submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons system .

    The UK has reiterated the necessity of nuclear weapons for the defence of the UK and its NATO allies. This was cemented in 2025 by the Labour government’s ‘triple lock guarantee’ encompassing: i) the building of four Dreadnought nuclear submarines; ii) maintaining the UK’s Continuous At-Sea Deterrent (CASD) 24 hours a day, 365 days a year; and iii) delivering all future upgrades to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the weapon system.

    The UK Initiated work on a new nuclear warhead (A21/Mk7/Astraea) to replace the current Trident Holbrook warhead “to ensure an effective deterrent for as long as required” and started work at RNAD Coulport for the introduction of new facilities to support the new warhead. It also announced plans to procure the Mark 7 aeroshell and non-nuclear components from the US under 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement (made permanent in 2024) and 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement and continued its collaboration on the Trident strategic weapon system and warhead safety, security, and advanced manufacturing technologies to ensure the UK warhead remains compatible with the US Trident system.

    In addition, it is widely accepted as having authorised the return of forward-deployed US B61 bombs (the modern B61-12 variant) to RAF Lakenheath, home to the US 48th Fighter Wing that operates F-15E Strike Eagle and F-35A Lightning II JSF.

    The UK also stated in the 2025 SDR that it “must explore how to support the US and its NATO Allies in strengthening extended deterrence across the Euro-Atlantic” in response to the challenge posed by Russia. It will do this by “enhancing its contribution to deterrence and assurance in the Euro-Atlantic” and announced it would purchase 12 new F-35A fighter jets and join NATO’s dual capable aircraft nuclear mission. The new F-35A aircraft will be based at RAF Marham and will be “available to fly NATO’s nuclear mission in a crisis”. The UK described this as the “biggest strengthening of the UK’s nuclear posture in a generation”.

    Sources

    • Ministry of Defence. Defence Nuclear Enterprise: 2025 Annual Update to Parliament (London, 2025).
    • John Walker. A History of the United Kingdom’s WE 177 Nuclear Weapons Programme: From Conception to Entry into Service 1959-1980’ (BASIC, London: 2018), p. 31.
    • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 4 April 1995) Column 1095W; Secretary of State for Defence. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996. Cm 3223. p. 24.
    • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 30 July 1998. Column 436-37W.
    • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 15 July 1992. Column 815W.
    • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 22 May. 2006 Column 1329W. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060522/text/60522w0014.htm#06052325002256
    • Ministry of Defence.The United Kingdom's Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2022 Update to Parliament (London: 2022).
    • Ministry of Defence.The United Kingdom's Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2018 Update to Parliament (London: 2018).
    • Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO). The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Command 6994 (HMSO: London, December: 2006).
    • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 11 March 2005. Column 1257W.
    • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Statement. 9 September 2009. Column 137WS.
    • Ministry of Defence. Memorandum from Ministry of Defence. House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Manufacturing and Skills Base’, HC 59 (HMSO: London: 2006), p. Ev. 86.
    • NukeWatch. How the US Air Force brought nuclear weapons to Lakenheath air base: The inside story. 22 July 2025 https://www.nukewatch.org.uk/how-the-us-air-force-brought-nuclear-weapons-to-lakenheath-air-base-the-inside-story/
  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    (a) See previous section

    (b) The UK has not entered into bilateral or multilateral nuclear arms reduction discussions or processes. It has previously stated that UK nuclear weapons will be included in negotiations when the UK is satisfied with progress towards the goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons.

    The UK has not invited external verification of the unilateral reductions in its nuclear arsenal because of the absence of a wider arms control context involving reciprocal obligations from other nuclear states.

    (c) The UK made a number of changes to its declaratory policy in 2010 by strengthening its negative security assurance that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NPT NNWS unless the state is in material breach of its NPT non-proliferation obligations.

    The UK declared in a joint P5 statement in 2022 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

    However, UK governments have repeatedly stated that nuclear weapons remain an essential and “ultimate insurance” for national security.

    (d) The UK has condemned the DPRK’s continued development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes and supported UNSCRs 1718, 1874, 2087 and 2094.

    The UK has participated in the E3+3 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme; supported six UNSCRs on Iran’s nuclear programme, and negotiated the JCPOA is implementation.

    The UK made a major contribution to the G8 Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction and, as part of the UK’s G8 Presidency in 2013.

    The UK has also expanded its work on nuclear disarmament verification through the QUAD, IPNDV and UN GGEs.

    (e) The UK de-targeted its submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons in 1994 and ‘de-alerted’ its nuclear weapons in 1998 Strategic Defence Review to several days' notice to fire.

    (f) The UK states that its nuclear weapon command and control system is fully independent, and that the UK has full operational control over its use and only the Prime Minister can authorise the use of UK nuclear weapons.

    In 1992 the UK government declared the Holbrook warhead design for its Trident SLBMs as one-point safe meaning the warhead will not produce a nuclear yield if accidentally detonated by an explosion at a single point in its conventional high explosive system.

    The UK hosted the ninth P5 Conference on 12-13 February 2020 in London and led a number of expert-level P5 working groups on nuclear doctrines and risk reduction and in 2021 declared it will “champion strategic risk reduction and seek to create dialogue among states possessing nuclear weapons…to increase understanding and reduce the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation.”

    (g) The UK has funded projects on nuclear-armed states’ conceptions of their responsibilities in relation to nuclear weapons.

    It provides annual updates to Parliament on the progress of the Dreadnought Class submarine programme.

    The UK publishes annual information on holdings of civil separated plutonium, HUE, LEU and natural uranium in the civil nuclear cycle.

    The UK asked Parliament to vote in 2016 on the principle of maintaining a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence (CASD) posture and continuing with the programme to build four new SSBNs to maintain the UK’s nuclear weapons programme and won by a significant majority (472 to 117).

    The UK hosted the sixth P5 Conference in London in February 2015 on further steps on transparency.

    The UK has reduced transparency in 2021 by no longer providing figures for the operational stockpile, deployed warheads or deployed missile numbers “Given the changing security and technological environment.”

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    (a) The UK has not undertaken any further reductions in its nuclear arsenal.

    (b) The UK has not addressed the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process.

    (c) The UK further clarified the negative security assurance set out in 2010 and reiterated in 2021, stating that it regards a material breach as referring to a State developing or attempting to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, not safeguards or procedural issues.

    The UK released a joint statement in 2022 with France and the United States further reaffirming its NPT-related positive and negative security assurances.

    The UK has not taken any further steps to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.

    Instead, the UK has continued the modernisation of the nuclear weapons complex and submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons system (see Action 3).

    The current Labour government has repeated that nuclear weapons are an essential insurance and “our ultimate insurance policy that protects our freedoms and our way of life”.

    The UK has increased the role and significance of nuclear weapons through its commitment in the 2025 Strategic Defence Review to purchase 12 F-35A fighter jets in order to join NATO’s dual capable aircraft nuclear mission.

    (d) The UK reiterated in a statement in 2024 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

    The UK initiated a programme of work with NNWS and civil society on irreversibility in nuclear disarmament and participated in discussions with NWS and NNWS on strategic risk reduction.

    It continued its work on nuclear disarmament verification through the QUAD, IPNDV and UN GGEs.

    The UK continued to condemn the DPRK’s continued development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes and supported relevant UNSCRs. It also continued to call on Iran to abide by its safeguards obligations under the NPT, fully cooperate with the IAEA and seek a diplomatic solution to concerns about its nuclear programme.

    (e) The UK has not taken any further steps to reduce the operational status of its nuclear weapons systems.

    (f) The UK has not reported specific new measures to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons. When asked if the UK intended to commission an independent ‘failsafe’ review of the safety, security, and reliability of its nuclear weapons, nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), and integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems following the example of the US Department of Defence, the UK Minister of State replied “We have absolute confidence in the safety, security and reliability of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, but for the purpose of safeguarding national security, we will not provide detailed comment on arrangements for its assurance.”

    The UK submitted a joint working paper with the US and France to the 2022 NPT Review Conference on ‘Principles and responsible practices for Nuclear Weapon States’ that set out a number of steps on risk reduction to which the UK is committed.

    The UK intends to use its chairing of the P5 process from mid-2025-mid-2026 to “convene substantive discussions on nuclear doctrine between the P5 states, and discuss nuclear risk reduction”.

    (g) The UK has reiterated the central importance of applying the principles of

    transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility to any nuclear disarmament efforts.

    The UK also published the Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper in 2024, which it says

    provides the fullest account of the UK’s Defence Nuclear Enterprise.

    The UK has refused to confirm whether or not US B61-12 nuclear bombs have been deployed

    to RAF Lakenheath, stating that “remains a long-standing UK and NATO policy to neither

    confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location”.

    Sources

    • Hansard. House of Commons. 30 July 1998. Column 449 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo980730/text/80730w17.htm#80730w17.html_spnew8
    • Hansard. House of Commons.17 December. 1998. Column 363 https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1992/dec/17/trident
    • Hansard. House of Commons. 18 May 2011. Column 338.
    • Hansard. House of Commons. 23 November 2015. Column1079.
    • Hansard. House of Commons. 14 July 2014. Column 573
    • Ministry of Defence. The UK’s nuclear deterrent: the facts (London: 2025). https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-uks-nuclear-deterrent-the-facts
    • Hansard House of Common. 24 January 2025. Column 1236. https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2025-01-24b.1236.0&s=%22ultimate+insurance%22#g1236.1
    • Hansard. House of Lords. 6 March 2023. Column 568. https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2023-03-06/debates/76A1100E-D8A2-43E7-AF69-951ABE219C67/NuclearWeaponsFailsafeReview
    • Gordon Brown. Speech on Nuclear Energy and Proliferation. Lancaster House. 18 March 2009. https://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2009/03/17/PMSPEECH170309.pdf
    • John Major. Joint Press Conference in Moscow. 15 February 1994. https://johnmajorarchive.org.uk/1994/02/15/mr-majors-joint-press-conference-in-moscow-15-february-1994/
    • Ministry of Defence. The Strategic Defence Review (London: 1998).
    • Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrence. Cm 6994 (London: 2006).
    • Cabinet Office. Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. CP 103 (London: 2021).
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 1 May 2015.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Main Committee I. Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York), 5 August 2022.
    • NukeWatch. How the US Air Force brought nuclear weapons to Lakenheath air base: The inside story. 22 July 2025. https://www.nukewatch.org.uk/how-the-us-air-force-brought-nuclear-weapons-to-lakenheath-air-base-the-inside-story/
    • Ministry of Defence. The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad (London: 2025).
    • United Nations. Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki at the UN Security Council meeting on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. ‘Nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought: UK statement at the UN Security Council’ (New York). 18 March 2024.. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nuclear-war-cannot-be-won-and-must-not-be-fought-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council#:~:text=We%20reaffirm%20the%20P5%20leaders,maintain%20a%20minimum%20credible%20deterrent.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster I: Disarmament. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 1 May 2025.
    • BBC News. Call for government 'transparency' on nuclear bombs. 23 July 2025. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cy5w6xz7z0lo.
    • Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races. 3 January 2022. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61d308ffe90e071971e25654/Joint_Statement_Of_the_Leaders_of_the_Five_Nuclear-Weapon_States_On_Preventing_Nuclear_War_and_Avoiding_Arms_Races.pdf
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster II: Non-Proliferation. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 2 May 2025.
    • Prime Minister’s Office. UK to purchase F-35As and join NATO nuclear mission as Government steps up national security and delivers defence dividend. 24 June 2025. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-purchase-f-35as-and-join-nato-nuclear-mission-as-government-steps-up-national-security-and-delivers-defence-dividend
    • Royal Air Force. RAF F-35A marks a significant step in delivering a more lethal Integrated Force and joining NATO Nuclear Mission. 25 June 2025. https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/raf-f-35a-marks-a-significant-step-in-delivering-a-more-lethal-integrated-force-and-joining-nato-nuclear-mission/
    • H.E. Mr Aidan Liddle, Permanent Representative. Statement by the United Kingdom. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 14 March 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_%282024%29/UK_NSAs_statement.pdf
    • P3 Joint Statement on Security Assurances, 4 August 2022. https://2021-2025.state.gov/p3-joint-statement-on-security-assurances/
    • Getting to a world without nuclear weapons: a food-for-thought paper. 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. NPT/CONF.2020/WP.35 (United Nations, New York). December 10 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/WP.35
    • Principles and responsible practices for Nuclear Weapon States. Working paper submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. NPT/CONF.2020/WP.70 (United Nations, New York). 29 July 2022. https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/npt_conf.2020_e_wp.70.pdf
  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The UK (with France) became the first NPT nuclear-weapon states to ratify the CTBT on 6 April 1998 and it has maintained its moratorium on nuclear testing since.

    The UK is one of the largest financial contributors to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), providing £4.5 million annually. The UK maintains the United Kingdom National Data Centre and hosts 13 facilities spread across the UK and Overseas Territories, which support the International Monitoring System. These include 11 monitoring stations (either infrasound, hydroacoustic or radionuclide), an auxiliary seismic array and a radionuclide laboratory. These facilities are backed up by research through the Atomic Weapons Establishment forensic seismology and radionuclide team.

    The UK provides technical experts, R&D and training and UK specialists contribute to CTBTO working groups and scientific development (e.g., seismic forensics at AWE Blacknest, radionuclide detection methods at GBL15).

    The UK has consistently pushed for the treaty’s entry into force and hosted a P5 Experts Meeting on nuclear disarmament verification and the CTBT in April 2012. The P5 has called upon all states to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force.

    At the 2015 Conference on the Entry into Force of the CTBT, Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt stated that “Promoting Entry into Force of the CTBT is one of the United Kingdom’s key disarmament and non-proliferation priorities. The UK strongly supports the continued development of the Treaty’s global verification regime.”

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    The UK stated at the High-Level Segment of the Conference on Disarmament in 2024 that the CTBT is an "essential treaty” and a “fundamental instrument that contributes to international security and disarmament.

    The UK stated in its 2025 report to the NPT that the CTBT and its entry into force are “a vital part of the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament. The UK continues to be a vocal campaigner, including by regularly lobbying states to sign and ratify.”

    The UK has continued to be one of the largest financial contributors to the CTBTO, continuing to provide extensive technical and administrative support and to maintain the UK National Data Centre and thirteen facilities spread across the world that support the International Monitoring System.

    Sources

    • Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Station Profiles. https://www.ctbto.org/our-work/station-profiles
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2025.
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.
    • Atomic Weapons Establishment. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Monitoring. https://www.awe.co.uk/what-we-do/national-security/comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-monitoring/
    • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Statement, 21 May 2013. Column 71WS. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2013-05-21/debates/13052150000027/NuclearDisarmamentAndNon-Proliferation
    • Alistair Burt. UK Ministerial intervention by Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Article XIV Conference Entry into. 23 September 2011. https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/uk_2011.pdf
  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The UK has supported efforts to agree a comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a FMCT and developed recommendations to these ends.

    The UK stated in its 2010 report to the NPT that “The UK continues to press for negotiations on an FMCT within the Conference on Disarmament and is working actively with other states, including the NWS, to explore ways of moving forward”. More specifically, the UK reports it has “maintained a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices since 1995. In 1998, the UK declared the total size of its fissile material stocks and voluntarily placed all fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards. This material continues to be liable for inspection by the IAEA. Since then, all enrichment and reprocessing in the UK has been conducted under international safeguards. However, the UK retains the right to resume such activities outside safeguards, under the terms of the UK’s Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) with the IAEA, until agreement is reached on an FMCT.”

    The UN General Assembly met on 24 September 2010 for a high-level meeting devoted to “revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations”. The UK urged countries not to block the start of negotiations on an FMCT, arguing that this is “damaging for multilateral arms control and may lead committed nations to bypass traditional institutions in order to further their disarmament ambitions”.

    The UK actively participated in the 2017-18 high-level fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) expert preparatory group, the 2014-15 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and in Subsidiary Body 2 of the Conference on Disarmament in 2018 and 2022 to identify issues upon which future FMCT negotiators will need to focus.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    The UK reiterated in its 2025 report to the NPT that it “has set out publicly that nuclear disarmament requires a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty that bans the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This will need a cross-regional collective effort, and the UK continues to press for negotiations on an FMCT within the CD and is working actively with other NWS and NNWS, to explore ways to move forward.”

    In September 2024 12 countries including the UK launched a cross-regional group called Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty to expand support for a FMCT negotiation. The ‘FMCT Friends’ comprises Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

    However, the UK has not been able (or willing) to broker or lead a new successful consensus on a full, robust Programme of Work in the CD. The repeated failures of consensus reflect structural difficulties in the CD widely acknowledged by disarmament observers.

    Sources

    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2025.
    • Leo Docherty. Minister for Europe. Statement to the Conference on Disarmament (United Nations, Geneva). 27 February 2023. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/un-conference-on-disarmament-27-february-2023-minister-for-europe-statement
    • Statement by Mr Alistair Burt. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. High Level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations (United Nations New York). 24 September 2010. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2010/statements/part3/24Sept_UK.pdf
    • Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. U.S> Department of State. 23 September 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/
    • Ambassador Jo Adamson. Statement on Revitalisation of the Conference on Disarmament by the UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (United Nations, Geneva) 14 June 2012. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2012/statements/part2/14June_UK.pdf
    • Ambassador Matthew Rowland. Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament. Statement. (United Nations, Geneva) 30 July 2023. https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2013/Statements/part3/30July_UK.pdf
    • High-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group. Note by the Secretary-General. A/73/159 (United Nations, New York). 13 July 2018, https://docs.un.org/en/A/73/159
    • Group of Governmental Experts to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Note by the Secretary-General. A/70/81 (United Nations, New York). 7 May 2021. https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/D19612093ED869EFC1257EC40033A6B3A7081.pdf
    • H.E. Mr Aidan Liddle. Permanent Representative. Statement by the United Kingdom. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), 28 May 2024. https://docs-library.unoda.org/Conference_on_Disarmament_-_%282024%29/UK_nuclear_disarmament_statement.pdf
  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The 1998 Strategic Defence Review declared the UK’s total stockpile of fissile material as part of its commitment to the control of fissile material. This comprised 7.6 tonnes of plutonium; 21.9 tonnes of highly enriched uranium; and 15,000 tonnes of other forms of uranium.

    The Review stated that 4.4 tons of plutonium, including 0.3 tons of weapons-grade plutonium, and over 9,000 tonnes of non-highly enriched uranium were no longer required for defence purposes and would be now be placed under European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) safeguards and made liable to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Moreover, the UK would cease exercising its right to withdraw fissile material from safeguarded stocks for nuclear weapons. The 4.4 tons of fissile material surplus to defence requirements, including 0.3 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium, was transferred to the UK’s civilian plutonium stockpile.

    The Review also stated that “All stocks of highly enriched uranium will, however, be retained outside safeguards, since material no longer needed for nuclear weapons will be used for the naval propulsion programme. We have considered whether further disaggregation of these totals at this time would be compatible with our continuing, if reduced, security requirement. We have concluded that it would not.”

    The ‘Historical Accounting for UK Defence Highly Enriched Uranium’ published by the Ministry of Defence in 2006 reiterated that “MoD HEU is held outside international safeguards for defence purposes, but is subject to a strict materials accountancy regime”.

    The UK confirmed in 2010 that this material was under European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) safeguards and liable to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The material is stored at the Sellafield nuclear site.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    The UK has not declared any fissile material as no longer required for military purposes in the current review cycle.

    In 2025 the Labour government stated a long-term intention to immobilise all UK-owned civilian plutonium.

    Sources

    • Ministry of Defence. Historical Accounting for UK Defence Highly Enriched Uranium (London: 2006).
    • Ministry of Defence. The United Kingdom's Defence Nuclear Weapons Programme: Plutonium and Aldermaston – An Historical Account (London: 2000).
    • Ministry of Defence. The Strategic Defence Review (London: 1998).
    • Ambassador John Duncan. UK Statement to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (United Nations, New York). 21 May 2010. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-statement-to-the-2010-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference
    • Michael Shanks. Plutonium Disposition Strategy. House of Commons. 24 January 2025. https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2025-01-24/hcws388
  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The UK has submitted regular reports on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

    It submitted a report at the 2010, 2015 and 2022 NPT Review Conferences.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    The UK submitted a draft report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference in 2025.

    Sources

    • Ambassador John Duncan. UK Statement to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (United Nations, New York). 21 May 2010. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-statement-to-the-2010-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2025.
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/617b0205e90e07198018fa32/UK-national-report-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-10th-review-conference.pdf
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document (London: 2021). https://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2015-0154/UK_Report_Pursuant_to_the_NPT_Review_Conference.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com
  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The UK played an important role in finalising a standard reporting form through the P5 dialogue process. The Joint Statement of the 2014 P5 meeting in Beijing stated “welcomed the achievement under France’s leadership of P5 consensus on a reporting framework. They introduced to each other their national reports consistent with this reporting framework and Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT RevCon Final Document, with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom”.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    The UK submitted a draft report to the 2026 NPT Review Conference in 2025 based on the standard reporting form.

    Sources

    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Draft National Report Pursuant to Actions 20 and 21 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2010 Review Conference Final Document (London), 11 March 2025.
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/617b0205e90e07198018fa32/UK-national-report-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-10th-review-conference.pdf
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document (London: 2025). https://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2015-0154/UK_Report_Pursuant_to_the_NPT_Review_Conference.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com
    • Working paper submitted by the P5. Joint statement of the P5 Beijing conference” Enhancing strategic confidence and working together to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review outcomes. Beijing, 14-15 April 2014. NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.33 (United Nations, New York) 24 April 2014. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/780595?v=pdf
  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The UK was subject to the 1957 Euratom Treaty from joining the European Community in 1973 to leaving the European Union on 31 January 2020. All nuclear material in the UK not intended for defence purposes was subject to reporting to, and inspection by, the Euratom safeguards inspectorate during this period.

    The UK signed an Additional Protocol in 1998 to the “Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. The AP enhanced the IAEA’s ability to verify the peaceful uses of nuclear material within the UK by providing additional inspection powers and access to information.

    Euratom is a separate body from the EU, but it is governed by the EU Commission and linked to the EU's legal framework. This necessitated the UK's withdrawal from it as part of the Brexit process. In order to maintain the extent and coverage of nuclear safeguards and to minimise the amount of adjustment required by UK nuclear operators the UK negotiated a new Additional Protocol with the IAEA that was signed on 7 June 2018 to replace the UK's existing Additional Protocol to the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Euratom. The UK then passed domestic legislation through the “Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019” to establish the UK's domestic safeguards regime following its exit from Euratom. This enabled the UK to meet its international non-proliferation obligations, including those with the IAEA, when it came into force on 31 January 2021.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    N/A

    Sources

    • International Atomic Energy Agency. Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/951. 12 January 2021.
    • Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. INFCIRC/263/Add.1. International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna). 24 February 2025.
  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The UK’s Export Control Act 2002 and Export Control Order 2008 provide an updated legal framework for the UK to restrict exports that could be used for nuclear weapons, including dual-use items and related technology. Exporters must obtain a license from the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) for any controlled export. The UK uses its export control legislation to implement the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and fulfill its NPT obligation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The effect is that non-NPT states without comprehensive safeguards (India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea) are ineligible for UK nuclear exports. This constitutes a structural mechanism to ensure ‘preferential treatment’ for NPT parties.

    India is an exception following the 2008 statement on civil nuclear co-operation with India by the NSG. This provides an exception from the NSG guidelines for exports to civil nuclear facilities in India that are safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The UK subsequently reviewed its policy towards nuclear-related exports to India. In 2010, the UK and India signed a Civil Nuclear Co-operation Declaration. The licensing policy to India was reviewed in 2010 in the Written Ministerial Statement by Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Alistair Burt. This resulted in the 2017 UK/India: Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

    In addition, the UK and Pakistan, which is not a member of the NPT, regularly discuss the peaceful uses of nuclear technology during their bilateral Dialogue on Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament. These dialogues allow both countries to exchange views on the topic, but they are not part of a civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement or Memorandum of Understanding on civil nuclear cooperation.

    The UK currently has a Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and Memorandum of Understanding on civil nuclear cooperation with Australia, Canada, China, Czechia, Euratom, Finland, India, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Russia, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, and the US.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    The UK has continued its current practice and signed a number of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and Memorandum of Understanding on civil nuclear cooperation since leaving the European Union and Euratom over the current NPT review cycle, but none with developing countries.

    Sources

    • Alistair Burt. Ministerial Statement. UK Civil Nuclear Trade Policy (India). House of Commons. 29 November 2010. https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2010-11-29/debates/1011294000012/UKCivilNuclearTradePolicy%28India%29
    • Communication dated 10 September 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of Germany to the Agency regarding a ‘Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India’. INFCIRC/734 (IAEA, Vienna). 18 September 2008. https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/communication-dated-10-september-2008-received-permanent-mission-germany-agency-regarding-statement-civil-nuclear-cooperation-india
    • UK/India: Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. TS No.1/2017 (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London). 12 January 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ts-no12017-ukindia-agreement-for-co-operation-in-the-peaceful-uses-of-nuclear-energy
    • Louisa Brooke-Holland. An introduction to UK arms exports (House of Commons LIbrary, London). 24 January 2024. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8312/CBP-8312.pdf
    • Department for Energy and Net Zero and the Office for Nuclear Regulation. Importing and exporting nuclear-related items and the role of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements between the United Kingdom and international partners. 2024https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65d31e920f4eb1f5bba98118/nuclear-cooperation-agreements-guidance.pdf
  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The UK has engaged in peaceful nuclear cooperation and supported developing countries in the uses, safety and security of nuclear technology for medicine, agriculture and power. This has been channelled through the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation (TC) programme or bilateral aid.

    The UK reported that it has paid its Regular Budget and Technical Cooperation Fund contributions to the IAEA in full and on-time and made significant extra-budgetary contributions to support the refurbishment of the Seibersdorf laboratories, and in support of the IAEA's nuclear safety and security programmes which underpin the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The UK reported in 2018 that it made a £4.1M contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

    The UK reported that it plays an active role in multilateral organisations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, including through the International Framework for Nuclear Energy (IFNEC), the Nuclear Innovation: Clean Energy Future initiative, the Nuclear Energy Association, and the IAEA. The UK’s national report to the 2022 NPT Review Conference set out in more detail the projects it has funded through the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) on Sterile Insect Technique, Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL), Covid-19 response, Marine plastics, and the Marie Skłodowska Curie Fellowship Programme (MSCFP).

    The UK states that it has continued to support the IAEA's Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) launched in 2010 through its contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), to which it has contributed more than £20 million and more than £6 million in extra-budgetary contributions since 2020. This includes work on marine plastic pollution, isotope hydrology and environmental protection.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    The UK states that it has continued to support the IAEA's Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) launched in 2010 through its contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), to which it has contributed more than £20 million to the TCF and more than £6 million in extra-budgetary contributions since 2020. This includes work on marine plastic pollution, isotope hydrology and environmental protection. The UK also committed £1 million to Atoms for Food projects to boost food security and tackle global hunger in November 2024.

    The UK is also part of a group of States Parties who have come together to initiate a new Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses (SDPU) since 2022. We believe that States Parties can break new ground by working together to: bring in new voices and perspectives from across different specialisms; drive global awareness of how nuclear technology can address development challenges; and identify new opportunities for peaceful uses assistance. In February 2025, the UK delivered a Nuclear Dialogue in Kenya, convening regulators, civil society organisations and international experts to facilitate knowledge exchange on nuclear regulation and stakeholder engagement in Africa.

    Sources

    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2025 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (New York), 6 May 2025.
    • Statement by the United Kingdom. Cluster III: Peaceful Uses. United Kingdom Delegation at the 2018 Preparatory Committee for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Vienna), 1 May 2018.
    • Foreign and Commonwealth Office. National report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty (London), 5 November 2022.
  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Sources