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United Kingdom

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

The UK has eliminated its arsenal of WE177 gravity bombs that were deployed on Royal Air Force and Royal Navy aircraft and helicopters. All the weapons were dismantled by August 1998 and fissile material recovered from dismantled WE177 warheads was retained for defence purposes. The UK also dismantled its final Chevaline (Polaris) warheads in April 2002 leaving Trident as the UK’s sole nuclear weapons system.

The UK has also embarked on a wide-ranging modernisation of its nuclear weapons complex and submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons system since 2005. This has involved:

  • Construction of a new ‘Dreadnought’ class of ballistic missile submarines to deploy the Trident II (D5) SLBM following a parliamentary vote in 2007.
  • Participation in a US life extension programme to modernise the Trident SLBM fleet
  • Started work on a new A21/Mk7 ‘Astrea’ warhead to replace the current Holbrook warhead.
  • Investment in a suite of facilities at AWE Aldermaston and AWE Burghfield under the Nuclear Weapons Capability Sustainment Programme since 2005, including radiographic, hydrodynamics, and high-energy laser facilities, a new warhead assembly and disassembly plant, and a Future Materials Campus for the manufacture and storage of nuclear materials, improved science and analysis capabilities and processes to recover used materials.
  • Investment in the Technology Development Centre supporting the UK-France Teutates programme at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston (in operation since 2014) and the French Atomic Energy Commission’s Epure facility at Valduc, France, for future UK hydrodynamic and radiographic experiments.Significant investment in the Rolls Royce Raynesway site that produces submarine reactor cores for UK SSBNs and SSNs.
  • Significant investment in BAE Systems Barrow shipyard at Barrow-in-Furness that builds UK SSBNs and SSNs.
  • Significant investment in His Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde where the UK’s SSBN and SSN fleets are based including the Royal Naval Armaments Depot (RNAD) Coulport where nuclear warheads are stored and loaded onto submarines.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The UK has not undertaken any further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed. Instead, it has increased the ceiling on its stockpile of nuclear warheads from 225 to 260 and continued the modernisation of the nuclear weapons complex and its submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons system .

The UK has reiterated the necessity of nuclear weapons for the defence of the UK and its NATO allies. This was cemented in 2025 by the Labour government’s ‘triple lock guarantee’ encompassing: i) the building of four Dreadnought nuclear submarines; ii) maintaining the UK’s Continuous At-Sea Deterrent (CASD) 24 hours a day, 365 days a year; and iii) delivering all future upgrades to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the weapon system.

The UK Initiated work on a new nuclear warhead (A21/Mk7/Astraea) to replace the current Trident Holbrook warhead “to ensure an effective deterrent for as long as required” and started work at RNAD Coulport for the introduction of new facilities to support the new warhead. It also announced plans to procure the Mark 7 aeroshell and non-nuclear components from the US under 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement (made permanent in 2024) and 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement and continued its collaboration on the Trident strategic weapon system and warhead safety, security, and advanced manufacturing technologies to ensure the UK warhead remains compatible with the US Trident system.

In addition, it is widely accepted as having authorised the return of forward-deployed US B61 bombs (the modern B61-12 variant) to RAF Lakenheath, home to the US 48th Fighter Wing that operates F-15E Strike Eagle and F-35A Lightning II JSF.

The UK also stated in the 2025 SDR that it “must explore how to support the US and its NATO Allies in strengthening extended deterrence across the Euro-Atlantic” in response to the challenge posed by Russia. It will do this by “enhancing its contribution to deterrence and assurance in the Euro-Atlantic” and announced it would purchase 12 new F-35A fighter jets and join NATO’s dual capable aircraft nuclear mission. The new F-35A aircraft will be based at RAF Marham and will be “available to fly NATO’s nuclear mission in a crisis”. The UK described this as the “biggest strengthening of the UK’s nuclear posture in a generation”.

Sources

  • Ministry of Defence. Defence Nuclear Enterprise: 2025 Annual Update to Parliament (London, 2025).
  • John Walker. A History of the United Kingdom’s WE 177 Nuclear Weapons Programme: From Conception to Entry into Service 1959-1980’ (BASIC, London: 2018), p. 31.
  • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 4 April 1995) Column 1095W; Secretary of State for Defence. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996. Cm 3223. p. 24.
  • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 30 July 1998. Column 436-37W.
  • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 15 July 1992. Column 815W.
  • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 22 May. 2006 Column 1329W. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060522/text/60522w0014.htm#06052325002256
  • Ministry of Defence.The United Kingdom's Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2022 Update to Parliament (London: 2022).
  • Ministry of Defence.The United Kingdom's Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2018 Update to Parliament (London: 2018).
  • Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO). The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Command 6994 (HMSO: London, December: 2006).
  • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Answers. 11 March 2005. Column 1257W.
  • Hansard. House of Commons. Written Statement. 9 September 2009. Column 137WS.
  • Ministry of Defence. Memorandum from Ministry of Defence. House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Manufacturing and Skills Base’, HC 59 (HMSO: London: 2006), p. Ev. 86.
  • NukeWatch. How the US Air Force brought nuclear weapons to Lakenheath air base: The inside story. 22 July 2025 https://www.nukewatch.org.uk/how-the-us-air-force-brought-nuclear-weapons-to-lakenheath-air-base-the-inside-story/

United States

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What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

In the latter stages of the Cold War and immediately following its ending, the United States––both of its own volition and in concert with other countries––led the world in reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile. This led to an approximately 85 percent reduction from its Cold War peak. In particular, the United States also reduced its non-strategic nuclear arsenal by more than 90% since the end of the Cold War.

The United States’ 2010 Nuclear Posture Review included notable adjustments to US nuclear policy, including a strengthened negative security assurance to “not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations,” as well as commitments to fulfilling its deterrence objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and establishing conditions where a “sole purpose” policy could be safely adopted.

These policy shifts guided much of US nuclear policy throughout the first half of the period between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences. In February 2011 and January 2012, the Department of Defense released a new National Military Strategy and a corresponding new defense strategy, both of which reaffirmed plans to achieve US deterrence objectives with a smaller nuclear force that would reduce both the number of warheads in the US stockpile and their role in US national security strategy.

In 2013, the Obama administration announced the first revision of its nuclear weapons employment guidance since 2002, which directed the Department of Defense to align US nuclear missions with the guidance of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. This narrowed the scope of missions through which nuclear weapons could be employed, reduced the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, and directed the Department of Defense to examine and reduce the role of launch under attack in nuclear planning. The employment guidance also referenced a 2013 inter-agency review—which included the participation of the State Department, the Defense Department, the National Security Council, the intelligence community, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Strategic Command, and the Office of the Vice President, which concluded that US deterrence requirements could be met by reducing US nuclear forces by up to one-third. Despite these actions, however, the Obama administration also initiated a large-scale nuclear modernization campaign and introduced a new gravity bomb to the arsenal––the B61-12.

The New START Treaty, to which the United States is a party, placed limits on deployments of strategic nuclear warheads and launchers. The United States met the treaty’s central limits by the deadline of February 2018. As part of the posture changes associated with New START, the United States de-MIRVed its intercontinental ballistic missile force such that each ICBM now carries only a single warhead, converted a portion of its nuclear-capable bomber force to conventional roles, and reduced the number of launch tubes on each ballistic missile submarine by four per boat.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review continued the nuclear modernization campaign that had been initiated under the Obama administration, but also added two supplementary capabilities: the low-yield W76-2 warhead for the ballistic missile submarine force, and a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). The deployment of the W76-2 did not result in an increase in the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, as its development involved modifying a small number of existing weapons.

Between fiscal years 1994 and 2020, the United States reduced its nuclear stockpile from 10,979 to 3,750, and dismantled approximately 9,100 warheads. However, the overwhelming majority of these reductions took place prior to 2010, and the pace of dismantlement dropped by approximately 53 percent after 2010, from an average of 547 warheads per year to 258 warheads per year after 2010. [1] During this period, entire classes of warhead where dismantled, including the dismantlement of all W62 warheads by August 2010, all B53 gravity bombs and all components associated with the W70 warhead by October 2011, and the W80-0 by the end of Fiscal Year 2012.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

The United States’ Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition activities, which are conducted at the Pantex Plant, were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and resulted in a significantly slower warhead dismantlement rate after 2020 than in previous years. Between fiscal years 2020 and 2023, the United States’ nuclear stockpile remained stable at approximately 3,750 warheads, and during this time the Department of Energy dismantled approximately 589 warheads: approximately 135 warheads per year––an approximate 48 percent reduction in annual dismantlement pace from the 2010-2020 time period.

The Department of Energy had previously been on pace to complete the dismantlement of all warheads retired before Fiscal Year 2009 by the end of Fiscal Year 2022; however, due to delays partially related to the pandemic, the Department of Energy had not yet announced the completion of this milestone by the end of Fiscal Year 2025. Despite these delays, the Department of Energy completed the dismantlement of all planned W84 warheads by the end of FY 2025 and increased its staffing commitments to support other scheduled dismantlement requirements.

In 2022, the United States’ Nuclear Posture Review identified specific nuclear capabilities that were considered superfluous to US deterrence requirements. These capabilities, and resulting efforts, included the cancellation of the nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) and the retirement of the B83-1 gravity bomb––the last megaton-yield warhead in the US nuclear stockpile. Although a program of record for the SLCM-N has since been initiated through congressional intervention, the B83-1 is in the process of being retired.

In 2023, the Department of Defense announced the planned development of a new gravity bomb, the B61-13, but noted that it will not increase the overall number of weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

Sources

U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA517286.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011: Redefining America’s Military Leadership. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/NMS2011.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA554328.pdf.

U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 19, 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states

U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 June 2013. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA590745.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21‑F‑0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 15 November 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/15/2003584623/-1/-1/1/REPORT-ON-THE-NUCLEAR-EMPLOYMENT-STRATEGY-OF-THE-UNITED-STATES.PDF.

U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and 2022 Missile Defense Review. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 27, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.

U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review 2018. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review-Version-2.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy. "Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile." Washington, DC: Department of Energy, July 22, 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/U.S.%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20Stockpile%20Transparency%207_22_24.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. Fiscal Year 2023 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary: Report to Congress. Washington, DC: National Nuclear Security Administration, April 2023. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/FY23%20SSMP_FINAL.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. Fiscal Year 2024 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan: Report to Congress. Washington, DC: National Nuclear Security Administration, November 2023. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-11/FY24SSMP_FINAL_NOVEMBER_2023_0.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. Fiscal Year 2025 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary: Report to Congress. Washington, DC: National Nuclear Security Administration, September 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/FY2025%20Stockpile%20Stewardship%20and%20Management%20Plan.pdf.

U.S. Department of Energy. “October 25, 2011 — Last B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantled.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, October 25, 2011. https://www.energy.gov/management/october-25-2011-last-b53-nuclear‑bomb-dismantled.

U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. “Press Release: W70 Dismantle 10/21/11.” Washington, D.C.: NNSA, October 21, 2011. https://web.archive.org/web/20111024172603/http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/w70dismantle102111.

Pantex Final FY12 PER. Amarillo, TX: Pantex Plant / DOE/NNSA, 2012. Accessed via Nuclear Watch New Mexico. https://nukewatch.org/oldsite/importantdocs/resources/Pantex_Final_FY12_PER.PDF.

What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

France retired its ground-based nuclear missiles Pluton in 1991 and dismantled the Hades weapon system in 1997. The ground-based component was fully dismantled in 1998.

In 1998, France reduced the number of ballistic missile submarines from 6 to 4.

In 2008, it reduced the number of squadrons affected to the nuclear mission from three to two (Strategic Air Forces), which was effective in 2013.

What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

No specific additional action has been undertaken between 2022 and 2026

Sources

National report submitted by France. National report pursuant to actions 5, 20 and 21 of the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2015–2022. NPT/CONF.2020/42. (New York), 20 December 2021. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/42