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United States

Disarmament

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    As one of the negotiating members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States’ has pledged to support the fundamental goals of the treaty since its inception. In line with these policies, the United States has led the world in reducing the size of its nuclear stockpile from its Cold War peak, achieving an approximately 85 percent reduction. However, successive administrations have interpreted, prioritized, and acted upon the NPT’s goals differently.

    For example, in 2009, President Obama’s “Prague Speech” set the framework for US nuclear posture during the period between the 2010 and 2015 NPT Review Conferences, and particularly its commitment to “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,” and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy while ensuring the credibility of its national and extended deterrence. In doing so, the Obama administration placed a particular premium on the disarmament pillar of the NPT that would not be echoed by its successor.

    While the first Trump administration remained committed in principle to the NPT, it deemphasized disarmament in favor of the NPT’s first pillar––non-proliferation. Speeches and working papers delivered to the NPT’s Preparatory Committee during the first Trump administration stated that “non-proliferation is the cornerstone of the NPT,” and that “Neither meaningful international nuclear cooperation nor disarmament could succeed in the absence of strong non-proliferation guarantees.” Rather than pursuing disarmament objectives directly, the administration instead suggested that “all NPT Parties bear responsibility for working together to improve the geopolitical environment and create the conditions for nuclear disarmament.”

    While the Biden administration preserved the Trump administration’s “Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” initiative, it also rhetorically adopted a greater emphasis on disarmament, noting in its national action plan submitted to the 2020 Review Conference that the United States “seeks to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy;” “seeks the reduction of global nuclear stockpiles in a way that promotes international stability, peace, and security;” and that “U.S. policy is to maintain a credible deterrent […] with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons, consistent with our current and future security requirements.”

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Since the 2020 Review Conference, both the Biden and second Trump administrations have reaffirmed their successive support for the NPT, although the general tone of U.S. statements has shifted from that of the previous decade.

    The Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) emphasized that “The United States will pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach that places renewed emphasis on arms control, non-proliferation, and risk reduction to strengthen stability, head off costly arms races, and signal our desire to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons globally.” In addition, President Biden offered rhetorical support for the NPT, announcing in 2022 that “the United States renews its commitment to the world to be a responsible steward of its nuclear arsenal, and to continue working toward the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”

    During the Biden administration, however, the emphasis on disarmament that was present during the Obama administration appeared to be diminished, with new warheads being introduced and a senior National Security Council official noting that “Absent a change in the trajectory of adversary arsenals, we may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from current deployed numbers is required.”

    While it remains early in the second Trump administration, its rhetoric appears to generally be in line with that of its predecessor. The Trump administration’s statements at the 2025 NPT Preparatory Committee emphasized the United States’ longstanding support for all three pillars of the NPT, noting that “The NPT remains in the national interest of the United States.” The statements also pushed back against criticism that the United States was not meeting its NPT commitments, and urged other countries, particularly Russia, China, Iran, Syria, and North Korea, to demonstrate their respective commitments to the Treaty. It also critiqued efforts to “seek shortcuts to nuclear disarmament,” instead promoting engagement on arms control.

    Notably, the administration’s remarks relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy indicated a commitment “to unleashing a golden age of American energy and ushering in a nuclear energy resurgence,” and inviting all other nations to join the United States’ efforts.

    Sources

      • bama, Barack. Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague, as delivered. Washington, DC: The White House, April 5, 2009. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered
        United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.
        United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.
        United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, July 31-August 11, 2023. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.I_.04_-_04._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_U.S._National_Report_Update.pdf.
        U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and 2022 Missile Defense Review. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 27, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.
        Biden, Joseph R., Jr. "President Biden Statement Ahead of the 10th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." White House, August 1, 2022. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/01/president-biden-statement-ahead-of-the-10th-review-conference-of-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/.
        U.S. Department of State. "As Drafted Statement by the United States to the NPT Preparatory Committee: Cluster One Statement by Matthew Sharp."May 1, 2025. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/20250501-NPT-PrepCom-2025-U.S.-National-Statement-on-Cluster-1_As-Delivered.pdf.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The United States has long recognized that effective verification is a key principle of nuclear disarmament, and that it takes on heightened importance as nuclear stockpiles continue to reduce. To that end, between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences the United States led, contributed to, and participated in several initiatives designed to lay the groundwork for future breakthroughs in nuclear disarmament verification. These initiatives included:

        • The UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) to Consider the Role of Verification in Advancing Nuclear Disarmament, which met for three sessions in 2018-2019 and adopted a consensus report confirming the essential role of verification in nuclear disarmament.
        • The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), which has brought together more than 100 experts from 30 countries to collaboratively develop solutions to the technical challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification. Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the IPNDV’s work included the development of scientific papers, the development and execution of five field exercises designed to test capabilities like high explosive detection methods and Special Nuclear Material presence/absence verification.
        • The program of cooperation under the 1958 U.S.-U.K. Mutual Defense Agreement to evaluate verification-specific technologies and procedures, such as the managed-access procedures, storage protocols, and chain of custody at nuclear weapons facilities.
        • The Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership with the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden to further investigate verification requirements for future arms control treaties, including the development of a multi-year plan of work based on lessons learned through exercises like the 2017 Quad Letterpress Exercise.
        • Unilateral U.S. research initiatives to develop datasets and capabilities to facilitate warhead dismantlement verification, including the establishment of a nuclear warhead and component signature set that can be leveraged to support future treaty verification activities, as well as the evaluation of the potential feasibility of radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags during inspection scenarios.
          In addition, the United States released information about the size of its nuclear stockpile and its number of dismantled warheads on multiple occasions between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences; the latest disclosure during this period was in October 2021, covering the status of the stockpile through September 2020.
          To enhance transparency, each year between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences the United States released its annual Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan to describe how the Department of Energy sustains the US nuclear stockpile without underground nuclear explosive testing. [6] In addition, throughout this period, the United States hosted representatives from non-nuclear weapon States parties and Sandia National Laboratories, with the goal of providing additional transparency regarding the United States’ stockpile stewardship and management activities.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    During the current Review Cycle, the United States released information about the size of its nuclear stockpile and its number of dismantled warheads through September 2023––the only Nuclear Weapon State to do so.

    In 2024, the US-led International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification celebrated its ten-year anniversary. It is currently nearing the end of its third and final phase of work, and continues to build global capacity on nuclear disarmament monitoring and verification among its 30 partner countries. In particular, throughout the life cycle of IPNDV, the United States has led working groups focused on developing technological solutions for nuclear disarmament verification.

    To enhance transparency via-à-vis the United States’ stockpile stewardship, the United States also released its annual Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan to describe how the Department of Energy sustains the US nuclear stockpile without underground nuclear explosive testing. In addition, journalists and civil society experts were invited to tour the Nevada National Security Site to view the United States’ stockpile stewardship capabilities, and representatives from NPT States parties were invited to Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory for transparency visits.

    Sources

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

    U.S. Department of State. "Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile." Fact Sheet. October 5, 2021. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Fact-Sheet_Unclass_2021_final-v2-002.pdf.

    U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration. "Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile." U.S. Department of Energy. Accessed October 24, 2025. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/transparency-us-nuclear-weapons-stockpile.

    International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. “Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Insights from a Decade of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.” June 2024. https://www.ipndv.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/IPNDV-Capstone_FINAL-1.pdf.

    U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration. "Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP)." U.S. Department of Energy. Accessed October 24, 2025. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/stockpile-stewardship-and-management-plan-ssmp.

    Clark, Heather. “Sandia hosts first Nonproliferation Treaty Transparency Visit.” Sandia Lab News, April 17, 2015. https://www.sandia.gov/labnews/2015/04/17/15-17-04/.

    National Nuclear Security Administration. “Two NNSA National Labs host Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty representatives from around the world for transparency visit.” July 21, 2022. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/two-nnsa-national-labs-host-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-representatives-around.

    National Nuclear Security Administration. “NNSA demonstrates transparency during arms control and nonproliferation experts’ visit to Nevada.” December 1, 2023. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-demonstrates-transparency-during-arms-control-and-nonproliferation-experts-visit.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    In the latter stages of the Cold War and immediately following its ending, the United States––both of its own volition and in concert with other countries––led the world in reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons in its stockpile. This led to an approximately 85 percent reduction from its Cold War peak. In particular, the United States also reduced its non-strategic nuclear arsenal by more than 90% since the end of the Cold War.

    The United States’ 2010 Nuclear Posture Review included notable adjustments to US nuclear policy, including a strengthened negative security assurance to “not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations,” as well as commitments to fulfilling its deterrence objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and establishing conditions where a “sole purpose” policy could be safely adopted.

    These policy shifts guided much of US nuclear policy throughout the first half of the period between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences. In February 2011 and January 2012, the Department of Defense released a new National Military Strategy and a corresponding new defense strategy, both of which reaffirmed plans to achieve US deterrence objectives with a smaller nuclear force that would reduce both the number of warheads in the US stockpile and their role in US national security strategy.

    In 2013, the Obama administration announced the first revision of its nuclear weapons employment guidance since 2002, which directed the Department of Defense to align US nuclear missions with the guidance of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. This narrowed the scope of missions through which nuclear weapons could be employed, reduced the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, and directed the Department of Defense to examine and reduce the role of launch under attack in nuclear planning. The employment guidance also referenced a 2013 inter-agency review—which included the participation of the State Department, the Defense Department, the National Security Council, the intelligence community, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Strategic Command, and the Office of the Vice President, which concluded that US deterrence requirements could be met by reducing US nuclear forces by up to one-third. Despite these actions, however, the Obama administration also initiated a large-scale nuclear modernization campaign and introduced a new gravity bomb to the arsenal––the B61-12.

    The New START Treaty, to which the United States is a party, placed limits on deployments of strategic nuclear warheads and launchers. The United States met the treaty’s central limits by the deadline of February 2018. As part of the posture changes associated with New START, the United States de-MIRVed its intercontinental ballistic missile force such that each ICBM now carries only a single warhead, converted a portion of its nuclear-capable bomber force to conventional roles, and reduced the number of launch tubes on each ballistic missile submarine by four per boat.

    The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review continued the nuclear modernization campaign that had been initiated under the Obama administration, but also added two supplementary capabilities: the low-yield W76-2 warhead for the ballistic missile submarine force, and a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). The deployment of the W76-2 did not result in an increase in the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, as its development involved modifying a small number of existing weapons.

    Between fiscal years 1994 and 2020, the United States reduced its nuclear stockpile from 10,979 to 3,750, and dismantled approximately 9,100 warheads. However, the overwhelming majority of these reductions took place prior to 2010, and the pace of dismantlement dropped by approximately 53 percent after 2010, from an average of 547 warheads per year to 258 warheads per year after 2010. [1] During this period, entire classes of warhead where dismantled, including the dismantlement of all W62 warheads by August 2010, all B53 gravity bombs and all components associated with the W70 warhead by October 2011, and the W80-0 by the end of Fiscal Year 2012.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    The United States’ Weapon Dismantlement and Disposition activities, which are conducted at the Pantex Plant, were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and resulted in a significantly slower warhead dismantlement rate after 2020 than in previous years. Between fiscal years 2020 and 2023, the United States’ nuclear stockpile remained stable at approximately 3,750 warheads, and during this time the Department of Energy dismantled approximately 589 warheads: approximately 135 warheads per year––an approximate 48 percent reduction in annual dismantlement pace from the 2010-2020 time period.

    The Department of Energy had previously been on pace to complete the dismantlement of all warheads retired before Fiscal Year 2009 by the end of Fiscal Year 2022; however, due to delays partially related to the pandemic, the Department of Energy had not yet announced the completion of this milestone by the end of Fiscal Year 2025. Despite these delays, the Department of Energy completed the dismantlement of all planned W84 warheads by the end of FY 2025 and increased its staffing commitments to support other scheduled dismantlement requirements.

    In 2022, the United States’ Nuclear Posture Review identified specific nuclear capabilities that were considered superfluous to US deterrence requirements. These capabilities, and resulting efforts, included the cancellation of the nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) and the retirement of the B83-1 gravity bomb––the last megaton-yield warhead in the US nuclear stockpile. Although a program of record for the SLCM-N has since been initiated through congressional intervention, the B83-1 is in the process of being retired.

    In 2023, the Department of Defense announced the planned development of a new gravity bomb, the B61-13, but noted that it will not increase the overall number of weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

    Sources

    U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA517286.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Defense. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011: Redefining America’s Military Leadership. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011. https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/NMS2011.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Defense. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA554328.pdf.

    U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 19, 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states

    U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 June 2013. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA590745.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21‑F‑0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Defense. Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 15 November 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/15/2003584623/-1/-1/1/REPORT-ON-THE-NUCLEAR-EMPLOYMENT-STRATEGY-OF-THE-UNITED-STATES.PDF.

    U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and 2022 Missile Defense Review. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 27, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review 2018. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review-Version-2.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Energy. "Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile." Washington, DC: Department of Energy, July 22, 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/U.S.%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20Stockpile%20Transparency%207_22_24.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. Fiscal Year 2023 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary: Report to Congress. Washington, DC: National Nuclear Security Administration, April 2023. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/FY23%20SSMP_FINAL.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. Fiscal Year 2024 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan: Report to Congress. Washington, DC: National Nuclear Security Administration, November 2023. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-11/FY24SSMP_FINAL_NOVEMBER_2023_0.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. Fiscal Year 2025 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan – Biennial Plan Summary: Report to Congress. Washington, DC: National Nuclear Security Administration, September 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/FY2025%20Stockpile%20Stewardship%20and%20Management%20Plan.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Energy. “October 25, 2011 — Last B53 Nuclear Bomb Dismantled.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, October 25, 2011. https://www.energy.gov/management/october-25-2011-last-b53-nuclear‑bomb-dismantled.

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. “Press Release: W70 Dismantle 10/21/11.” Washington, D.C.: NNSA, October 21, 2011. https://web.archive.org/web/20111024172603/http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/w70dismantle102111.

    Pantex Final FY12 PER. Amarillo, TX: Pantex Plant / DOE/NNSA, 2012. Accessed via Nuclear Watch New Mexico. https://nukewatch.org/oldsite/importantdocs/resources/Pantex_Final_FY12_PER.PDF.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    To maintain compliance with the central limits of the New START Treaty, by February 2018 the United States had removed 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from their silos, made four launch tubes on each of the United States’ 14 SSBNs incapable of launching ballistic missiles, and converted 41 B-52 heavy bombers to conventional-only roles. In addition, the United States de-MIRVed its intercontinental ballistic missile force such that each ICBM now carries only a single warhead.

    The United States fully abided by the treaty’s verification regime, which included more than 320 on-site inspections and the exchange of more than 23,000 data notifications relating to the treaty between the United States and Russia. In 2021, the United States worked with Russia to successfully extend the treaty by the maximum of five years, until February 2026.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    During the Review Cycle, the United States continued to fully abide by the central limits and inspection regime; however, in response to Russia’s violations of New START, the United States took lawful reciprocal countermeasures and ceased to provide its updated data as of 1 March 2023. On 1 June 2023, the United States also began to withhold treaty notifications regarding the status of treaty-accountable items.

    The United States has repeatedly expressed that it is ready to negotiate a new arms control treaty to replace New START after its expiry in February 2026, provided that Russia engages in good faith. In September 2025, however, President Putin offered to voluntarily maintain the New START limits if the United States reciprocates, and as of December 2025 Russia stated that it had yet to receive a “formal answer” from the United States.

    Sources

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

    U.S. Department of State. 2024 Report to Congress on Implementation of the New START Treaty. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, January 17, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/UNCLASS_NST-Implementation-Report_2024-FINAL-Updated-Accessible-01.17.2025.pdf.

    Faulconbridge, Guy, and Lucy Papachristou. “Russia says it awaits an answer from the US on New START as nuclear treaty ticks down.” Reuters, December 10. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russia-says-it-awaits-an-answer-us-new-start-nuclear-treaty-ticks-down-2025-12-10/

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    a) See response to Action 3.

    b) In 2010, the United States signed the bilateral New START Treaty with Russia, which placed limits on deployments of strategic nuclear warheads and launchers. The Treaty, however, did not cover non-strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, in 2019 the first Trump administration withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which had previously eliminated and prohibited an entire range-class of delivery system.

    c) In 2013, the Obama administration announced the first revision of its nuclear weapons employment guidance since 2002, which directed the Department of Defense to align U.S. nuclear missions with the guidance of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. This narrowed the scope of missions through which nuclear weapons could be employed, reduced the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, and directed the Department of Defense to examine and reduce the role of launch under attack in nuclear planning.

    The Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and corresponding nuclear employment guidance indicated a change from previous policy, with the latter document noting that because “nuclear-armed potential adversaries chose not to follow the U.S. lead in reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies […] it would be imprudent for the United States to reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally at this time or in the near future.”

    The 2018 NPR also added a new role for US nuclear weapons: “hedging against an uncertain future,” which prompted the development of two “supplements” to the U.S. force structure: the low-yield W76-2 warhead and the new nuclear sea-launched cruise missile.

    d) In an effort to increasingly engage with the disarmament community and with Non-Nuclear Weapon States, in 2015 the P5 invited NNSW and civil society to briefings and outreach events alongside the P5 Conference in London. This was the first time that non-nuclear weapon states were invited to a discussion session as part of a P5 Conference.

    e) The United States boycotted the first two conferences addressing the human consequences of nuclear weapons in 2013 and 2014; however, it participated in the third conference in Vienna in 2014, promoting the need for progress on disarmament verification and monitoring as a means towards a nuclear-free world.

    f) In 1992, the George H. W. Bush administration commissioned a report by the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Failsafe and Risk Reduction, which included dozens of concrete recommendations to reduce the risk of unauthorized, accidental, or mistaken nuclear use. However, the majority of these recommendations would require updating for the digital age, particularly as the next generation of nuclear systems will be reliant on networked infrastructure.

    g) Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States formally met with other members of the P5 approximately ten times to discuss measures for promoting confidence-building and nuclear disarmament. The United States hosted the third and seventh such conferences in Washington, DC, in 2012 and 2016. The United States also participated in inter-sessional meetings at the working level. At each meeting, the United States––alongside its P5 partners––emphasized the continued importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, the 2010 Action Plan as a framework for achieving disarmament, and continued discussion on the issues of transparency, confidence-building, and verification.

    To increase mutual understanding and confidence among the P5 and to facilitate discussions with and among Non-Nuclear Weapon States, the United States also participated in the Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, which produced a glossary of 227 terms for submission to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

    In addition, in 2010 the Obama administration unprecedentedly declassified the entire history of the US nuclear stockpile, including the annual stockpile size, the number of dismantled warheads since 1994, and the number of retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. [8] The United States continued to disclose these data on an annual basis until the Trump administration denied successive declassification requests between 2019 and 2021, after which transparency was restored and the figures from the missing years were disclosed.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    a) See response to Action 3.

    b) In 2022, the Biden administration articulated its arms control priorities––particularly vis-à-vis Russia––as needing address all nuclear weapons, rather than just strategic ones. Throughout both the Biden administration and second Trump administration, the United States continued to abide by the central limits of New START, which limits the deployment status of strategic warheads and launchers.

    c) In January 2022, in a historic statement, the United States jointly affirmed alongside the P5 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and that nuclear weapons should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war. Notably, the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) removed “hedging against an uncertain future” as a stated role for U.S. nuclear weapons. [14] Mirroring the Obama administration’s previous language, the Biden administration’s NPR also noted that a “key goal” for the United States is “reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy.”

    d) In its 2022 statement, the P5 declared that they “each intend to maintain and further strengthen our national measures to prevent unauthorized or unintended use of nuclear weapons,” and reaffirmed the practice of ensuring that “none of their nuclear weapons were targeted at each other or any other state.”

    The Biden administration’s NPR also identified current and planned capabilities that “are no longer required to meet our deterrence needs”––specifically the B83-1 and the SLCM-N, and left the door open for future retirement of the W76-2 low-yield warhead following a re-evaluation of its deterrence value. Despite these actions, these capabilities had not been cancelled or retired by the end of 2025, and the SLCM-N has since been adopted into a program of record.

    e) Although it participated in the third conference addressing the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons in 2014, the United States did not attend the fourth conference in 2022.

    f) In light of advances in artificial intelligence and its incorporation into modern military systems, the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review stated that the United States will maintain a human “in the loop” “for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President to initiate and terminate nuclear weapon employment.”

    As directed by Congress, in fiscal year 2022 the Department of Defense commissioned an independent review of the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons; the nuclear command, control, and communications infrastructure that underpins it; and the U.S. integrated tactical warning and attack assessment systems that allow the U.S. to quickly and accurately characterize incoming threats.

    g) Alongside the P5, the United States helped update the glossary of key nuclear-related terms for joint submission to the 2022 NPT Review Conference. Although the P5 Process has slowed substantially following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, throughout the Review Cycle the United States chaired and participated in several P5 meetings at the expert level, including in August 2022, October 2023, February 2023, and December 2024.

    Following the Biden administration’s declassification of the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in 2021, it denied successive requests until 2024, during which it restored the previous years' missing data. It appears that the United States is shifting towards disclosing these figures on an ad hoc, rather than annual, basis.

    Following Russia's unilateral suspension of New START in February 2023, the United States publicly disclosed one final set of deployment-related treaty data from March 2023, but subsequently has not released any deployment data since then.

    Sources

    U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: The White House, June 19, 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states

    U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 June 2013. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA590745.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review 2018. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review-Version-2.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Defense. Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, November 30, 2020. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21-F-0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.

    China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/243293.pdf.

    The White House. "Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races." Press release. January 3, 2022. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/.

    China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States. P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. Working paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.51. New York: United Nations, 2021. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3956428.

    U.S. Department of Defense. "Increasing Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile." Fact Sheet. May 3, 2010. Available via the Internet Archive. https://web.archive.org/web/20100528062643/http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Energy. Response to Freedom of Information Act Request Dated October 1, 2018. April 5, 2019. Available via the Federation of American Scientists. https://sgp.fas.org/news/2019/04/stockpile-2018.pdf.

    U.S. Department of State. "Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile." Fact Sheet. October 5, 2021. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Fact-Sheet_Unclass_2021_final-v2-002.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Energy. "Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile." August 2024. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/U.S.%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20Stockpile%20Transparency%207_22_24.pdf.

    U.S. Department of State. "2024 Report to Congress on Implementation of the New START Treaty." January 17, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/2024-report-to-congress-on-implementation-of-the-new-start-treaty/.

    Stewart, Mallory. “Keynote Address for the Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Arms Control Association.” US Department of State, June 2, 2022. https://www.state.gov/keynote-address-for-the-commemoration-of-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-arms-control-association/

    U.S. Department of Defense. 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and 2022 Missile Defense Review. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 27, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.

    Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, Republic of Austria. “Conference Report: Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.” 8-9 December 2014. https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/ViennaConference_BMEIA_Web_final.pdf.

    U.S. Department of Defense. “Final Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Failsafe and Risk Reduction (FARR) (U).” 1992. https://archive.org/details/FinalReportoftheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeonNuclearFailsafeandRiskReductionFARR/page/n1/mode/2up.

    U.S. Department of State. "Joint Statement from the Nuclear-Weapon States at the London P5 Conference." Press statement. February 5, 2015. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/02/237273.htm.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    During his 2009 “Prague Speech,” President Obama announced that the United States would “immediately and aggressively” pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and enshrined it as a key priority for his administration’s non-proliferation agenda. That same year, Secretary of State Clinton attended the CTBT Article XIV Conference––the first time in nearly a decade that the United States had participated at the conference at that level of representation––and emphasized that “we will work in the months ahead both to seek the advice and consent of the United States Senate to ratify the treaty, and to secure ratification by others so that the treaty can enter into force.” Ultimately, the Obama administration was unsuccessful in securing ratification during its tenure.

    The Trump administration reversed its predecessor’s policies with respect to the CTBT. In its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump administration explicitly stated that it “will not seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.” [3] It did note, however, that it would “not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and call[ed] on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing.”

    Throughout this period, the United States extensively supported the development of the CTBT’s on-site inspection protocols and detection capabilities to create the ultimate conditions for universal ratification and entry into force. In a demonstration of support for the spirit of the treaty, the United States attended the International Day Against Nuclear Testing event hosted by Kazakhstan and the CTBT Article XIV Conference in 2021.

    .

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    As it has done since 1992, the United States has continued to abide by its moratorium on nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. In addition, during her tenure the Biden administration’s NNSA Administrator reiterated on multiple occasions that there was no technical need for the United States to resume nuclear testing. [6] In a demonstration of transparency, in 2022 and 2023 journalists and civil society experts were invited to tour the Nevada National Security Site to view the United States’ stockpile stewardship capabilities, and representatives from NPT States parties were invited to Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory for transparency visits.

    The second Trump administration appears to be attempting to reverse these longstanding U.S. policy positions. In October and November 2025, President Trump made numerous statements indicating that he would begin the process of resuming U.S. nuclear testing. However, it remains unclear whether President Trump was referring to the actual testing of nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable delivery systems.

    Sources

      • bama, Barack. Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague, as delivered. Washington, DC: The White House, April 5, 2009. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered
        Clinton, Hillary R. Remarks at CTBT Article XIV Conference. New York, NY: September 24, 2009. https://www.ctbto.org/sites/default/files/Documents/240909_US.pdf.
        U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review 2018. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review-Version-2.pdf.
        United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.
        United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.
        Kimball, Daryl G., and Carol Giacomo. "Managing an Arsenal Without Nuclear Testing: An Interview With Jill Hruby of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration." Arms Control Today, December 2023. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-12/interviews/managing-arsenal-without-nuclear-testing-interview-jill-hruby-us-national.
        National Nuclear Security Administration. “Two NNSA National Labs host Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty representatives from around the world for transparency visit.” July 21, 2022. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/two-nnsa-national-labs-host-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-representatives-around.
        National Nuclear Security Administration. “NNSA demonstrates transparency during arms control and nonproliferation experts’ visit to Nevada.” December 1, 2023. https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-demonstrates-transparency-during-arms-control-and-nonproliferation-experts-visit.
        Brumfiel, Geoff. "Step Inside the Secret Lab Where America Tests Its Nukes." January 29, 2025, NPR, https://www.npr.org/2025/01/29/nx-s1-5276315/atomic-bomb-nuclear-weapons-lab-nevada.
        Trump, Donald (@realDonaldTrump). “The United States has more Nuclear Weapons than any other country. This was accomplished, including a complete update and renovation of existing weapons, during my First Term in office. Because of the tremendous destructive power, I HATED to do it, but had no choice! Russia is second, and China is a distant third, but will be even within 5 years. Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis. That process will begin immediately. Thank you for your attention to this matter! PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP.” Truth Social, October 29, 2025. https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115460423936412555.
      • ’Donnell, Norah. “President Trump on nuclear testing, the government shutdown, immigration, tariffs and U.S.-China relations.” CBS News, November 2, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-on-nuclear-testing-government-shutdown-immigration-tariffs-china-60-minutes-transcript/.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States participated in two United Nations initiatives relating to a proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: a 2014-2015 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and a 2017-2018 High-Level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group.

    The Group of Governmental Experts consensus report, which was published in May 2015, represented the most thorough intergovernmental assessment to-date of the nature and characteristics of an FMCT. The GGE considered a variety of topics, including treaty objectives, scope, definitions, verification, legal and institutional arrangements, duration, and withdrawal clauses, among many others.

    Building on the findings of the GGE, the High Level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group sought to lay the groundwork for future treaty negotiations by developing a menu of potential treaty elements that could eventually be incorporated into a treaty structure. These included considerations of how each of the above topics explored in the GGE could be institutionalized within a treaty framework. As the Preparatory Group sought to capture a wide range of views rather than to actually negotiate a treaty by narrowing the list of options, the menu is highly expansive and contains divergences between national positions. As such, this effort represents a model for inclusive multilateral engagement constructive deliberation.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    During the Review Cycle, the United States joined and actively participated in the new Friends of FMCT initiative, a cross-regional group with participation from both Nuclear-Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that aims to enhance political attention on and contribute support to the negotiation of an FMCT. As part of this initiative, in September 2024 the United States issued a joint statement with Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom in support of an FMCT in accordance with CD/1299. The statement also expressed support for all voluntary actions taken by states in support of the spirit of an FMCT, including moratoria on fissile material production, the dismantlement or conversion of fissile material production facilities, reporting on domestic stockpiles of civil plutonium, and the development of substantive proposals for the negotiation of an FMCT.

    In addition, the United States repeatedly called upon the Conference of Disarmament to agree upon a program of work that prioritizes the negotiation of an FMCT, and specifically noted that the growing nuclear programs of other nuclear-armed states makes this effort even more necessary.

    Sources

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

    Turner, Bruce. "Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty." Remarks delivered by Ambassador Bruce Turner, United States Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, March 12, 2024. https://geneva.usmission.gov/2024/03/12/remarks-to-the-conference-on-disarmament-on-a-fissile-material-cutoff-treaty/.

    United Nations General Assembly. Group of Governmental Experts to Make Recommendations on Possible Aspects That Could Contribute to but Not Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices: Note by the Secretary-General. A/70/81. New York: United Nations, May 7, 2015. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n15/133/37/pdf/n1513337.pdf.

    United Nations General Assembly. High-Level Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group: Note by the Secretary-General. A/73/159. New York: United Nations, July 13, 2018. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n18/223/57/pdf/n1822357.pdf.

    U.S. Department of State. “Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.” Press Statement, 23 September 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) annual declarations of its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel in excess of military requirements, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549). These declarations did not include declarations relating to highly enriched uranium (HEU).

      • f hundreds of eligible facilities, only one U.S. facility––the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site––has been under IAEA safeguards for decades and continued to remain under safeguards during the review period.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    The United States’ most recent declaration of its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel under INFCIRC/549 was transmitted to the IAEA in 2023. The declaration noted holdings of less than 0.05 metric tons of unirradiated separated plutonium produced during the course of manufacture or fabrication, 4.6 metric tons of plutonium contained in unirradiated MOX fuel, and 44.6 metric tons of unirradiated separated plutonium held elsewhere––all of which are roughly the same as the previous year’s figures.

    During the current Review Cycle, the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site has remained under IAEA safeguards.

    Sources

    United States of America. Communication Received from the United States of America Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. INFCIRC/549/Add.6-25. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2023. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1998/infcirc549a6-25.pdf.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    To enhance engagement and consultation across the P5, in 2014 the Nuclear-Weapon States adopted a national reporting framework with respect to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document and encouraged other NPT States Party to submit national reports using a similar framework.

    The United States’ national reports include actions taken by the United States to advance the 64-point Action Plan, including measures relating to nuclear reductions, alert status, arms control, stockpile transparency, fissile material reductions, confidence-building measures, safeguards, export controls, nuclear security, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

    The United States’ first national report was submitted to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, and its second report was submitted to the 2020 NPT Review Conference in 2022.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    In 2023, the United States submitted an update to its 2020 national report with the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which included the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.

    The United States is currently preparing its national report for the next NPT Review Conference in 2026.

    Sources

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, July 31-August 11, 2023. https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/NPT_CONF.2026_PC.I_.04_-_04._ADVANCE_UNEDITED_VERSION_U.S._National_Report_Update.pdf.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    In 2012, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted a working paper at the 2013 NPT Preparatory Commission proposing a standardized format for the Nuclear-Weapon States to provide enhanced transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals, and to report on actions taking in support of the 2010 Action Plan. Building upon this proposal, in 2014 the Nuclear-Weapon States adopted a national reporting framework with respect to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document.

    Although each of the NWS’ national reports includes varying levels of detail, the reporting framework is organized as follows:

    Section I: Reporting on national measures relating to disarmament

    Nuclear security policies, doctrine and activities associated with nuclear weapons

    Nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control (including nuclear disarmament) and verification

    Transparency and confidence-building measures

      • ther related issues
        Section II: Reporting on national measures relating to non-proliferation
        Safeguards
        Export controls
        Nuclear security
        Nuclear-weapon-free zones
        Compliance and other issues
      • ther contributions to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
        Section III: Reporting on national measures relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
        Promoting peaceful uses
        Technical assistance through the IAEA to its member states
        Nuclear safety and civil nuclear liability
      • ther related issues.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    The United States is currently preparing its national report for the next NPT Review Conference in 2026, which will presumably utilize the same reporting framework as its previous submissions.

    Sources

    Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates). Transparency of Nuclear Weapons: The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative: Working Paper. NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12. New York: United Nations, 2012. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12.

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

    Action 22: All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    The United States’ Additional Protocol came into force in 2009, granting the IAEA expanded rights to obtain a much fuller picture of the United States’ nuclear program and fuel cycle. This was done in part to assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that signing the Additional Protocol would not place them at a commercial disadvantage.

    The Additional Protocol requires the United States to submit declarations to the IAEA regarding research and development not involving nuclear materials; fuel cycle related manufacturing and production activities; uranium mines and concentration plants and thorium concentration plants; site declarations for some nuclear facilities; and, on a quarterly basis, the export of certain nuclear facilities and equipment. The United States’ Additional Protocol is limited to civilian nuclear facilities and exempts those directly related to national security.

    Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, the United States actively encouraged the establishment of the Additional Protocol standard as a precondition for exports of nuclear technical information and cooperation between states.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    Throughout the current Review Cycle, the United States continued to submit declarations to the IAEA in compliance with its Additional Protocol.

    After Iran announced in February 2021 that it would stop implementing its Additional Protocol, the United States has since repeatedly called upon Iran to return to verifiable implementation of its commitments. In addition, the United States has supported five IAEA Board of Governors resolutions censuring Iran for failing to comply with its safeguards obligations and investigations.

    Sources

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

    U.S. Department of State. "Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States (and Protocol Thereto)." Signed at Vienna, November 18, 1977. Entered into force December 9, 1980. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5209.htm.

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America. INFCIRC/288/Add.1. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, April 2, 2009. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1981/infcirc288a1.pdf.

    U.S. Department of State. 2025 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, April 2025. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/2025-Arms-Control-Treaty-Compliance-Report_Final-Accessible.pdf.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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Peaceful Uses

View peaceful uses actions for all countries

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Between the 2010 and 2020 NPT Review Conferences, under the auspices of the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) the United States made several notable financial and diplomatic contributions to expand access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy to States parties. Several of these contributions were specifically aimed to address the needs of non-nuclear weapon states and developing countries, including:

    The establishment of the American Assured Fuel Supply to function as a backup fuel supply for U.S. domestic or international partners;

    The contribution of nearly $50 million to the establishment and operationalization in 2019 of the IAEA’s Low Enriched Uranium Bank;

    The reallocation of €10 million to activities under the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy and technical cooperation projects managed by the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development, and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology and the Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean;

    The signing of five Nuclear Cooperation Memoranda of Understanding with Bulgaria, Ghana, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia to boost nuclear cooperation and support between the United States’ and these countries’ nuclear sectors.

    The collaboration between the U.S. Department of Energy and their counterparts in more than 100 countries––including many low- and medium-income countries––to promote regulation, oversight, and accessibility of peaceful uses projects.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

    At the NPT Review Conference in 2022, the United States, in partnership with the United Kingdom and with the political support of 29 other countries, launched the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses (SDPU). The SPDU is particularly focused on how the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can help further progress on the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals, particularly for those who are economically and socially vulnerable. The scope of the SPDU was shaped by subject matter experts and practitioners from the Global South and has spawned projects supporting water security in the MENA region; access to nuclear medicine in West Africa; sustainable financing to improve women’s health outcomes; food security in the context of climate change; and several others.

    Under the auspices of the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program, the United States has provided more than $20 million in voluntary contributions to the IAEA’s Rays of Hope initiative, which aims to provide cancer care to regions that lack sufficient funding or facilities for radiation treatment. The United States has also supported the IAEA’s flagship Nuclear Technology for Controlling Plastic Pollution initiative using irradiation to develop new recycling techniques, as well as Atoms4Food, which supports food security efforts through nuclear science.

    Sources

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

    Albania, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Norway, Paraguay, Romania, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States. "Facilitating Dialogue to Support Enhanced Peaceful Uses Cooperation as Envisioned under Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." Working Paper NPT/CONF.2020/WP.46/Rev.2. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/WP.46/Rev.2.

    U.S. Department of State. "Year One: Building a Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses for the NPT and a Brighter Future." Accessed October 24, 2025. https://2021-2025.state.gov/year-one-building-a-sustained-dialogue-on-peaceful-uses-for-the-npt-and-a-brighter-future/.

    U.S. Department of State. "The United States Contributes Up to $4 Million in Funding to the International Atomic Energy Agency to Support the Rays of Hope Initiative." December 14, 2022. https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-united-states-contributes-up-to-4-million-in-funding-to-the-international-atomic-energy-agency-to-support-the-rays-of-hope-initiative/.

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Technical Cooperation Report for 2024. GC(69)/INF/6. 69th Regular Session of the General Conference. Vienna: IAEA, 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc69-inf6.pdf

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    Prior to the current Review Cycle, the United States provided more than $390 million in voluntary contributions to support technical cooperation projects, a figure which includes $60 million above and beyond projects funded directly through the Technical Cooperation Fund.

    Through these contributions, the United States directly supported a variety of projects across the globe, including, among others:

    Implementing methods to trace oil and plastic pollution in marine waters;

    Building capacity to detect, quantify, and reduce the adverse impacts of harmful algal toxins on seafood safety;

    Continued development of a sustainable zone free of the tsetse fly in the Niayes region of Senegal;

    Improvement of veterinary laboratory capacities in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa;

    Strengthening food security worldwide by increasing crop production and soil fertility using nuclear techniques;

    Advancement of education and training in nuclear medicine;

    Enhancement of national capabilities to respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies in Africa;

    Enhancement of the capacity of national monitoring teams in Africa to ensure early detection of zoonotic diseases;

    Study of the possible impact of radioactive releases following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident;

    Improvement of the control of radioactive sources in Africa and the Mediterranean region;

    The provision of COVID-19 diagnostic testing kits.

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

      • ver two years between 2022 and 2024, the United States provided more than $50 million in voluntary contributions to support technical cooperation projects––approximately 25% of the total target share for technical cooperation during that time.
        The funds provided by the United States have helped support the IAEA’s technical cooperation projects, including the Rays of Hope initiative––which aims to provide cancer care to regions that lack sufficient funding or facilities for radiation treatment––and the Nuclear Technology for Controlling Plastic Pollution initiative, which leverages irradiation to develop new recycling techniques, as well as Atoms4Food, which supports food security efforts through nuclear science.

    Sources

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2015/38. 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, April 27–May 22, 2015. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2015/38.

    United States of America. "Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report Submitted by the United States of America." NPT/CONF.2020/47. Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, New York, August 1–26, 2022. https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2020/47.

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Technical Cooperation Report for 2024. GC(69)/INF/6. 69th Regular Session of the General Conference. Vienna: IAEA, 2025. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc69-inf6.pdf.

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Technical Cooperation Report for 2023: Supplement. GC(68)/INF/7/SUPPLEMENT. 68th Regular Session of the General Conference. Vienna: IAEA, 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc68-inf7_supplement.pdf.

    International Atomic Energy Agency. Technical Cooperation Report for 2023. GC(68)/INF/7. 68th Regular Session of the General Conference. Vienna: IAEA, 2024. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc68-inf-7.pdf.

  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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  • What has the NWS done so far (prior to the current Review Cycle)?

    What is the NWS doing on this action in the current Review Cycle?

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